FOUO LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION OFFICE OF BORDER PATROL (b) (7)(E)

Operations Order

Dates of Operation: 09/08/2010 thru Endstate

Operations Order: Operation Huckleberry


I. SITUATION

A. General Situation

- Operation Huckleberry is a Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) to previously approved Operation Martillo-

Law enforcement agencies throughout the Tucson Sector AOR are seeing an increase in incidents related to bandit activity or "RIP Crews" and armed Drug Trafficking Organizations which has raised the threat level in many areas to law enforcement agencies, local residents and illegal aliens. Bandit groups typically target backpacked drug loads and at times rob illegal alien groups. Another concern is that the bandit activity is extremely organized and related to; threats and assaults on officers; home invasions; hostage and kidnapping cases; homicides; and the increase of armed backpack loads by DTOs. There have been numerous incidents of violence to include shooting incidents in the past few years in the Tucson Sector AOR.

Tucson Border Patrol Sector Intelligence Reports indicate increased bandit and armed activity



On 08/28/10 (b) (7)(E) intelligence collection efforts in the targeted area obtained photographs of bandits armed with AK-47s which finally identified a pattern of travel and hours of operation of the bandit group. Knowing the tendency of this group to shift locations of RIP operations constantly, (b) (7)(E) developed a hasty plan to interdict this group at the current known target location.

B. Terrain and Weather:

1. General Target AO Description:

The Target Area is bordered on the north by (b) (7)(E), on the east by and on the west by a (b) (7)(E) and on the west by a (b) (7)(E) and on the west by a rocky and mountainous with brushy low ground and open high ground. The area is channelized through deep canyons, steep bluffs and some rolling hills. (b) (7)(E) is predominately scrub oak, cacti, catclaw, and cholla and some ground cover in low areas. Most of the carea and difficult to access by vehicle with little tactical infrastructure. There is no easy access to the area and most access is along the periphery.

2. Ingress / Egress Routes:

Determined based on mission specificity. Most of the Road infrastructure is limited in quantity and quality. (b) (7)(E)

3. Environmental Concerns:

Agents assigned to conduct operations in these remote location must be aware of the rugged nature of the terrain. The area is mostly rocky with scattered brush and is formed primarily of rolling hills, deep canyons and steep bluffs with little infrastructure. Due to the remote and rugged terrain

(b) (7)(E)

Most of the terrain is subject to flash floods during this monsoon season, extreme temperatures and very little standing water, increasing the challenges for extended lay-ins.

4. Weather and Light Data:

Weather and light data will be available from the weather conditions such as extreme heat and cold and summer monsoon should be expected during the operation.


C. Criminal Element Information:

1. What is the criminal activity related to?

(b) (7)(E)

2. Identification of and synopsis of criminal activities:

Specific organizations are unknown, however most of the incidents are reported as armed encounters with bandits. In general these organizations increasingly use counter-measures to avoid law enforcement detection. Much of this is done through the use of scanners, hand-held radios, extensive scouting and, in some instances, cover and concealment tactics normally associated with military units. Increased law enforcement presence and improvements in technology are forcing smugglers and bandit groups to constantly shift locations, change their tactics and techniques to sustain successful operations. It is suspected that the bandit groups are part of an organization that has been conducting RIPS in the AO for years. The organization seems to know when and where the operations will move.



5. Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA):

Bandits engage Agents in a coordinated effort while owning key terrain with a tactical advantage. See SOP for Actions on Objective

6. Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA):

Attempt to Evade Apprehension

II. MISSION:

(7)(E) (with (b) (7)(E) attachments) in coordination with (b)(7)(E) Station and Sector (b) (7)(E) will conduct a special reconnaissance/interdiction operation targeting the bandit activity operating in the Mountains area starting 09 SEPT 2010 in order to identify and dismantle the organization

conducting the bandit RIPS.

III. EXECUTION

A. Chief's Intent:

It is the Chief Patrol Agent's intent to prevent illegal Trans-National Incursions of any type and all Trans-National Threats into the United States of America.

It is the Tucson Sector Chief's intent to apprehend terrorists and terrorist weapons and to prevent the illegal trafficking of humans and narcotics into the interior of the United States through the Tucson Sector area of responsibility.

B. Commander's Intent:

(b) (7)(E) will conduct counter bandit operations within Tucson Sector in response to the increasing amount of high-risk incidents in the with this increase in manpower due to attachments, will be able to conduct effective missions in a targeted area while still maintaining the ability to flex to other parts of the Tucson Sector AOR for other threats and intelligence.

C. Concept of the Operation:

(b) (7)(E) will conduct a 2-phased special reconnaissance/interdiction operation in the targeted area in coordinated effort with Station and Sector (b) (7)(E) to interdict bandit groups and identify an organization to support investigative efforts that will dismantle the organization responsible for the bandit activity operating within Tucson Sector AOR.

Phase I (Special Reconnaisance/Interdiction Phase):

Gather intelligence on current bandit activity in the concentrated area between (b) (7)(E) area and (b) (7)(E) area. BTC will concentrate a combination of extended lay-in operations, sensors, game cams, specialized low light optics and Sector DISRUPT into the current concentrated target area to identify ingress/egress routes of bandits, bandit caves/hidesites, bandit RIP locations, possible safe/ stash houses, and pattern of life of scouts and drivers linked to the bandit organization.


- Due to the recent pictures of bandits on four occasions near (b) (7)(E), BTC will maintain teams in this area to interdict the bandits while other teams are identifying NAI's anticipating a shift from the bandits.

Phase I will be accomplished by maintaining teams near the game camera that captured a piece of the bandit groups current pattern to interdict them, while deploying additional teams to track (b) (7)(E) groups through the targeted area to identify routes, lay-ups, guides, stash houses and load-out sites. This will allow BTC to identify future RIP sites when the bandits shift and identify subjects possible connected to the organization.

Phase I's Measure of Effectiveness (MOE):

- Gather intelligence on bandit egress/ingress routes, hide-sites, and RIP sites in order to allow BTC to anticipate the areas the bandits will operate in the future when they shift.
- Gather intelligence through tracking and observation of (b) (7)(E) groups to possible link guides, backpackers, drivers, and stash houses to an organization
- Gather intelligence from bandits (when interdicted) that will identify TTP's and support an investigation.

(b) (7)(E)



will also maintain a team that will be responsible for gathering intelligence and conducting operations based on threats and intelligence in other target areas within the Tucson Sector AOR.


D. Coordinating Instructions:

1. Transportation and Processing of Apprehensions: As Per SOP of AOR

2. Special Instructions for the BP Units supporting the (b) (7)(E) Operation:

TBD

- 3. Special Coordinations required/conducted with other agency? Not Required
- 4. OAM Support Requirements:
 - a. POC: OAM Operations
 - b. Type of Air Frame:



- c. Video Capability? Yes
- d. FRIES or SPIES required? Yes
- e. Special Instructions:

Specifics will vary based on the mission. Air will be coordinated on a mission by mission basis

5. Additional Coordinating Instructions based on the mission:

Mission specific

6. Have pertinent law enforcement agencies been notified? Not Required

List of contacts:

OAM Operations (b) (7)(C), (b) (6)
TCA/BTC Operations (b) (7)(C), (b) (6)
Sector DISRUPT (b) (7)(C), (b) (6)

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE and LOGISTICS

A. Overtime Cost Expectations: TBD

- **B. Travel Specifics:**
 - 1. Location of Lodging:

N/A

2. Cost Estimate: \$0.00

C. Vehicle Maintenance and Logistics:

As per (b) (7)(E) SOP.

D. BORSTAR Medics Assigned: Mission Specific

E. Media Concerns:

As per SOP

F. Legal Review:

As per SOP

V. COMMAND and SIGNAL

A. Chain of Command

CPA (b) (7)(C), (b) (6)

(A) DCPA (b) (7)(C), (b) (6)

(A) Division Chief (b) (7)(C), (b) (6)

 $ACPA^{(b)(7)(C),(b)(6)}$

Commander TCA/BTC (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)

Deputy Commander TCA/BTC(b) (6), (b) (7)(C

B. Unit Chain of Command

1. Mission Commander: SOS (b) (7)(C), (b) (6) (TACON of SOG)

2. Team Leaders

SBPA (b) (6), (b) (7)(C)



C. Other Agency POCs: TBD		
D. Frequencies / Means of Control	(b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E) (b) (7)(E)	
A. Task Organization:1. Teams (Include type / personnel a	and Coordinates):	
4. TOC: Location		
B. Actions on Target:1. Primary Plan		
2. Alternate Plan		
3. Contingency Plans:		
4. Emergency Plans: a. Officer Down:		

2. SIGINT Requirements:

d. IEDs:

3. Scope / MSS / GSR Support Requirements:
4. Supporting OA Units:
E. Command and Control:
Team Frequencies:
1. Assault:
2. PMOs:
3. Perimeter:
4. Supporting Assets:
5. TOC / Incident Command:
Brevity Codes:
(b) (7)(E)